In February 2012 two bioethicists provoked international
outrage with an article advocating infanticide.
Writing in the Journal of Medical Ethics (JME), Alberto
Giubilini and Francesca Minerva argued in ‘After-birth
abortion: why should the baby live?’, that foetuses and newborns ‘do not have the
same moral status as actual persons’.
They concluded that ‘after birth abortion (killing a
newborn) should be permissible in all the cases where abortion is, including
cases where the newborn is not disabled’.
The same journal (JME) has this week responded to the crisis with a special issue containing 31 commentaries from a range of ethicists, some of whom have argued for years that infanticide can be a moral action; others who believe that even suggesting it is a vile stain on academic integrity.
The same journal (JME) has this week responded to the crisis with a special issue containing 31 commentaries from a range of ethicists, some of whom have argued for years that infanticide can be a moral action; others who believe that even suggesting it is a vile stain on academic integrity.
Editor Julian Savulescu introduces the issue with
these words:
‘Infanticide is an
important issue and one worthy of scholarly attention because it touches on an
area of concern that few societies have had the courage to tackle honestly and
openly: euthanasia. We hope that the papers in this issue will stimulate
ethical reflection on practices of euthanasia that are occurring and its proper
justification and limits.’
Savulescu claims to be ‘strongly opposed to the legalisation
of infanticide along the lines discussed by Giubilini and Minerva’ but says
that they are not alone in advocating it.
Infanticide is already practised openly and legally in the
Netherlands under the ‘Groningen
Protocol’ which allows doctors to end the life of neonates at the request
of their parents if the infant is experiencing ‘hopeless and unbearable
suffering’.
In addition some of the world's most famous living
philosophers have written about its merits and justification over the last
40 years, including Michael Tooley, Jonathan Glover, Peter
Singer, Jeff McMahan and John Harris.
Four of these five have contributed to this issue of JME and
the full text of their articles
is currently available on line.
McMahan argues that the permissibility of infanticide in
some circumstances is not only implied by certain theories, but by beliefs that
are widely held and difficult to reject.
Michael Tooley's book is entitled Abortion and
infanticide.
Peter Singer wrote a book in 1985 with Helga Kuhse
called Should the baby live?
Jonathan Glover's landmark Causing death and saving
lives notes that ‘Dr Francis Crick (the Nobel Laureate who discovered
DNA with Jim Watson in 1956) once proposed a two-day period for detecting
abnormalities, after which infanticide would not be permissible’.
Many will be shocked by what these philosophers are saying
but Savulescu argues that the issue throws up a broad range of ethical
questions fundamental to medical ethics.
What constitutes a person with rights? Is there a moral
difference between killing a baby of the same gestation inside and outside the
womb? Is there a moral difference between euthanasia and withdrawal of
treatment and/or sedation with the explicit intention that the baby will die?
In what circumstance is ‘letting die’ morally different from killing?
These are all serious questions which many people, including
many doctors, have not carefully thought through.
As I have previously
argued these bioethicists have actually done us a service. If we don’t like
their conclusions, then it should actually lead us to question the premises
from which they logically flow.
Philosophers like Peter Singer believe that it is the qualities of rationality, self-consciousness and communication that make human beings special. What follows from this is those humans with less of these qualities are of less value and can, in some circumstances, be disposed of.
By contrast this Christian view of the sanctity of life, which Singer and others reject, is that human beings have value not because of any ‘intrinsic’ qualities, but for two main ‘extrinsic’ reasons. First, that they are made in the image of God for an eternal relationship with him, and second because God himself became a human being in the person of Jesus Christ and thereby bestowed unique dignity on the human race.
If we follow that view through to its logical conclusion it leads us to say that any human being, regardless of its age, appearance, degree of deformity or mental capacity, is worthy of the highest possible degree of protection, empathy, wonder and respect.
These bioethicists are arguing that infanticide is morally no different to abortion.
Philosophers like Peter Singer believe that it is the qualities of rationality, self-consciousness and communication that make human beings special. What follows from this is those humans with less of these qualities are of less value and can, in some circumstances, be disposed of.
By contrast this Christian view of the sanctity of life, which Singer and others reject, is that human beings have value not because of any ‘intrinsic’ qualities, but for two main ‘extrinsic’ reasons. First, that they are made in the image of God for an eternal relationship with him, and second because God himself became a human being in the person of Jesus Christ and thereby bestowed unique dignity on the human race.
If we follow that view through to its logical conclusion it leads us to say that any human being, regardless of its age, appearance, degree of deformity or mental capacity, is worthy of the highest possible degree of protection, empathy, wonder and respect.
These bioethicists are arguing that infanticide is morally no different to abortion.
But we can draw one of two conclusions from that – either we
should embrace infanticide or stop doing abortions.
But whatever view we opt for, we should have the courage of our convictions to draw out its full practical implications as these bioethicists have done.
But whatever view we opt for, we should have the courage of our convictions to draw out its full practical implications as these bioethicists have done.
Most people are just not that consistent.
I soundly debunked the pro-choice myth of "enpersonment" (c.f. ensoulment) myself, in "The mumbo-jumbo of choice" on 27th March 2013, at
ReplyDeletehttps://johnallmanuk.wordpress.com/2013/03/27/the-mumbo-jumbo-of-choice/
but I'm apparently not important enough for anybody important to have noticed yet. (I try to live ethically, but I don't have a doctorate in being an Ethicist, so my original published thoughts don't get picked up, even though others echo them later.)
Alas, I discovered here
http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=379479&page=3
that I cannot claim to be the first to have coined this apt neologism.